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 Abstract 
This paper argues that skill-biased technical change has some deficiencies as a hypothesis 
about the impact of technology on the labor market and that a more nuanced view recently 
proposed by Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) is a more accurate description.  The difference 
between the two hypotheses is in the prediction about what is happening to employment in 
low-wage jobs.  This paper presents evidence that employment in the UK is polarizing into 
lovely and lousy jobs and that a plausible explanation for this is the Autor, Levy and 
Murnane hypothesis. 
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Introduction 
Economists writing about the impact of technology on the labor market in recent 
years have tended to emphasize the role played by skill-biased technical change 
(SBTC), the idea that technology is biased in favor of skilled workers and against 
unskilled workers.  The idea of SBTC has primarily been used to explain rising wage 
inequality (see Katz and Autor [1999] for a survey of a very large literature).  But a 
recent paper by Autor, Levy and Murnane (ALM) [2003] has argued for a more 
nuanced way of understanding the impact of technology in general (and computers in 
particular) on the labor market1.  They argue persuasively that technology can replace 
human labor in routine tasks, be they manual or cognitive, but (as yet) cannot replace 
human labor in non-routine tasks.  The ALM hypothesis is intuitively plausible and 
they provide evidence that industries in which routine skills were heavily used have 
seen the most adoption of computers, and this has reduced the extent of routine skills 
in those industries (see Spitz [2003] for similar evidence for Germany).  But, if the 
ALM hypothesis is correct then we might expect to see evidence for it in other areas: 
this is the aim of this paper.   
The basic idea is the following.  The SBTC hypothesis predicts that demand 
for ‘skilled’ jobs is rising relative to that in ‘unskilled’ jobs, while the ALM 
hypothesis suggests a more subtle impact of technology on the demand for labor of 
different skills.  The routine tasks in which technology can substitute for human labor 
include jobs like craft manual jobs and book-keeping jobs that require precision and, 
hence, were never the least-skilled jobs in the labor market.  The non-routine tasks 
which are complementary to technology include ‘skilled’ professional and managerial 
                                                 
1
  See also Card and DiNardo [2002] for the argument that SBTC is not as successful in explaining 
wage inequality as commonly thought. 
 2 
jobs but also many of the most ‘unskilled’ jobs such as shelf filling that rely on hand-
eye coordination that virtually all humans find easy but machines find enormously 
difficult.   
If this is true (and we provide evidence below that it is) then the impact of 
technology will be to lead to rising relative demand in well-paid skilled jobs (that 
typically require non-routine cognitive skills) and in low-paid least skilled jobs (that 
typically require non-routine manual skills) and falling relative demand in the 
‘middling’ jobs that have typically required routine manual and cognitive skills – a 
process we call job polarization.  This paper investigates whether the pattern of 
employment changes in Britain over the period 1975-99 is consistent with job 
polarization and the consequences of that. 
There is an existing literature related to the idea of job polarization – the ‘job 
quality’ debate in the US.  Some of the early papers on the rise in US wage inequality 
(e.g. Bluestone and Harrison [1988]) argued that there was an increasing number of 
low-wage jobs and a shrinking number of ‘middling’ jobs.  This was controversial 
even at the time (e.g. see Kosters and Ross [1988]) and most labor economists came 
to the conclusion that the problem for low-skill workers was a declining number of 
jobs for them rather than an increasing number (see Burtless [1990]).  But, in the 
1990s one can still find a number of papers continuing to address the major themes of 
the job quality debate (see, for example, Costrell [1990], Howell and Wolff [1991], 
Levy and Murnane [1992], Juhn, Murphy and Pierce [1993], Murphy and Welch 
[1993], Gittleman and Howell [1995], Ilg [1996], Farber [1997], Acemoglu [1999, 
2001], Juhn [1999], Ilg and Haugen [2000], Wright and Dwyer [2003]).  Although 
these studies do differ slightly in their conclusions, common themes do emerge, most 
notably that, in the last 30 years, there has been a very big increase in the number of 
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high-paid jobs and (probably) an increase in the number of low-paid service jobs – 
this is broadly consistent with the job polarization prediction of the ALM hypothesis 
although few of these papers give this interpretation. 
The plan of the paper is as follows.  In the first section, we use the US data 
from Autor, Levy and Murnane [2003] to show that the jobs that require non-routine 
tasks tend to be at the top and bottom of the wage distribution while the jobs that 
require routine tasks tend to be in the middle, thus leading to the job polarization 
prediction. The second section describes the data used for the UK. The third section 
then documents how job polarization can be observed in the UK between 1975 and 
1999 when the quality of jobs is defined by their median wage.  There has been a 
growth in lousy jobs (mainly in low-paying service occupations) together with a 
(much larger) growth in lovely jobs (mainly in professional and managerial 
occupations in finance and business services) and a decline in the number of middling 
jobs (mainly clerical jobs and skilled manual jobs in manufacturing).  We document 
that one sees these trends using all measures of employment, for men and women 
together or separately and for all definitions of ‘jobs’ that we use.  The fourth section 
considers an alternative way to look for evidence of job polarization previously used 
by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce [1993] and Juhn [1999] that predicts employment growth 
at each percentile of the wage distribution.  There is evidence of job polarization 
using this approach as well. 
As this conclusion is not in line with the predictions of the SBTC hypothesis, 
sections five and six consider the evidence most commonly cited in favor of that 
hypothesis. Section five considers the rise in the employment of non-manual workers 
- we argue that the pattern of within and between industry changes in employment 
observed at the 1-digit occupation level is consistent with the ALM hypothesis that 
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technical progress has displaced the labor of clerical and manual workers in all sectors 
of the economy but that differential productivity growth between manufacturing and 
service sectors has led to the growth in low-wage service employment (as originally 
proposed by Baumol [1967]).    
Section six documents that the well-known shift towards more educated labor 
has largely occurred within jobs and that there has been a rapid rise in educational 
attainment of workers even in the worst jobs.  There are two possible interpretations 
of this.  First, that there has been SBTC within jobs as we define them so that the 
consensus view on the importance of SBTC is correct.  Secondly, that as the 
educational attainment of all groups in the population has risen but the job distribution 
has become more polarized, some educated workers are forced into the low-skill jobs 
at the bottom end of the distribution.  The attraction of this view is that it can explain 
why there has been a simultaneous rise in the returns to education (the demand for 
educated workers has risen as the number of good jobs has increased) and in the level 
of over-education as some have claimed.  Distinguishing between these hypotheses 
requires evidence on changing skill requirements within jobs that is hard to find.  We 
review two pieces of evidence that might shed light on these questions although they 
are somewhat contradictory in their implications. 
The seventh section considers the extent to which the observed job 
polarization can explain the rise in wage inequality between the 1970s and 1990s. We 
find that a modest part of the rise in wage inequality can be explained by the 
polarization of jobs alone but that once one includes the fact that wage growth seems 
to be monotonically positively related to the quality of jobs one can explain most of 
the evolution of wage inequality.  The implication is that the rise in ‘within-group’ 
wage inequality that others have emphasized is more a product of a restricted 
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definition of a ‘group’ and that if one includes job controls then it largely disappears.  
However the finding that the wages in the lousy jobs are falling relative to those in the 
‘middling’ jobs presents something of a problem for the ALM hypothesis as one 
might expect the opposite if relative demand is rising in the lousy relative to the 
middling jobs.   
Section eight investigates whether supply–side factors, the changing 
composition of the labor force, notably the increasing importance of female labor, can 
explain part of job polarization.  The answer is ‘no’. The final section concludes. 
 
I. Routine Jobs, Non-routine Jobs and Technical Change 
In this section we show how the Autor, Levy and Murnane [2003] view of the 
impact of technology on the demand for different skills predicts job polarization.  
ALM use the US Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) to associate particular 
occupations with the intensity of use of five particular types of task.  The types of task 
included in the analysis are chosen to represent those that are affected in different 
ways by technology – they label them non-routine cognitive, non-routine interactive, 
routine cognitive, routine manual and non-routine manual (see Autor, Levy and 
Murnane [2003] for a more detailed description of the tasks given these labels).  
ALM then show that industries that were relatively intensive users of 
occupations that use routine tasks had more computerization and that the extent of the 
use of routine skills has fallen in these industries.  Here we pursue an angle of the 
ALM hypothesis that ALM do not develop – namely that jobs that can be routinized 
are not distributed uniformly across the wage distribution.  The central idea is that 
non-routine manual jobs are concentrated in the lower percentiles of the wage 
distribution whereas non-routine cognitive and interactive jobs are concentrated in the 
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top end of the wage range with routine jobs concentrated in the middle.  As a result, 
technological progress can be expected to result in job polarization with employment 
growth in lovely and lousy jobs and employment falls in ‘middling’ jobs. 
Table I presents a simple way of showing that the non-routine jobs are 
concentrated at the top and bottom of the wage distribution.  We use wage 
information from the CPS MORG 1983 file and assign to each individual the five task 
measures in 1977 used by ALM based on their occupations2. All skills are measured 
on a 10-point scale, although these should not be taken to be comparable across tasks. 
Table I tabulates the fraction of workers that have DOT scores above the overall mean 
DOT score for the 5 different tasks as a percentage of total employment within the 
three terciles of the wage distribution. For example, only 17% of all workers in the 
lowest paid occupations are in jobs that require above average non-routine cognitive 
skills. But 88% percent of workers in the highest paid occupations are in jobs that 
require above average non-routine cognitive skill. A similar picture holds for the non-
routine interactive skills: occupations intensive in non-routine interactive skills are 
concentrated in the right tail of the wage distribution. In contrast, routine intensive 
occupations are concentrated in the middle. Of workers in occupations earning 
between the 33rd and 66th wage percentiles, 63 % require above average routine 
cognitive and 58 % above average routine manual skills. These numbers are higher 
than for any other specified wage range.  Finally, the lowest paid occupations require 
a higher fraction of non-routine manual skills and its fraction is higher than for any 
other occupation paying higher wages. 
This section has shown some direct evidence that workers in the middling jobs 
used to do routine tasks, while workers in lousy and lovely jobs do non-routine tasks. 
                                                 
2
 We are grateful to David Autor for making the DOT data available to us. The year 1983 is the earliest  
year for which the DOT occupations can be merged into CPS data. 
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Since non-routine jobs are concentrated in both tails of the wage distribution, the 
ALM hypothesis predicts an increasing polarization of the workforce into lousy and 
lovely jobs. This predicted process of polarization provides an explanation for the 
empirical “facts” in an ongoing debate about the quality of jobs mentioned in the 
introduction. 
 
II. The Data 
The main data in this paper comes from Britain but we would expect the task 
composition of occupations and the impact of technology to be very similar to that 
observed in the US.  The data used in this paper come from two sources, the New 
Earnings Survey (NES) and the Labor Force Survey (LFS).  The New Earnings 
Survey is an annual panel dataset that started in 1968 though the first year for which 
computerized records are available is 1975, the sample being all individuals whose 
National Insurance number ends in ‘14’.  In April of each year the tax records are 
used to contact the employer of each of these workers who reports information on 
pay, hours, and, importantly for this paper, occupation and industry.  Although the 
NES is in theory a random sample, it is known to under-sample certain groups in 
practice, notably part-time workers (if weekly earnings fall below the threshold for 
paying National Insurance then they are unlikely to appear in the tax records) and 
those who have changed jobs recently (as the sampling frame is drawn up early in the 
year and the survey is likely to be sent to the wrong employer in April). 
 For this reason we supplement the NES with data from the Labor Force 
Survey.  The LFS was first conducted in 1975, then every two years until 1983, then 
annually until 1992 and quarterly since then (when a panel component was also 
introduced).  The LFS has a much smaller sample than the NES (and until 1993 it did 
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not contain any wage data) but does have the advantage that it is closer to a random 
sample. 
 In this paper we define a ‘job’ as a particular occupation or as a particular 
occupation in a particular industry.  The occupation part corresponds to the main 
usage of the term ‘job’ – the question in the LFS used to obtain the information on 
occupation is ‘what was your main job in the week ending Sunday?’.  The industry 
part of the definition of a job is more problematic but other papers in this area have 
used a similar definition and there are significant industry effects on wages even once 
one has controlled for occupation.  However, it is important to realize that the 
occupation part of our definition is much more important than the industry part as one 
gets very similar results whether a job is defined by occupation alone or by an 
occupation-industry interaction.   
We have explored using different levels of disaggregation by occupation and 
industry and the results seem robust to the level chosen.  We have restricted the 
results reported in this paper to using 3-digit occupation codes only (allowing for 
approximately 370 jobs) as well as the interaction of a 3-digit occupation and 1-digit 
industry classification (allowing for a maximum of 3700 jobs, although in practice 
only about 1600 exist as not all occupations are represented in all industries). One 
might wonder about whether there are jobs that are disappearing and new ones 
popping up. In practice this does not seem to be a problem: of the occupations that 
existed in the 1970s all still have workers in them in the late 1990s and there are 
essentially no new occupations that cannot be put into the 1970s classification.  
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III. Trends in the Quality of Jobs 
We start by looking at long-term trends in the quality of jobs.  To do this, 
obviously requires a measure of the quality of a ‘job’.  We do this in a very simple 
way by using the median wage in the job at the beginning of the period (see OECD 
[2001] and Meisenheimer [1998] for a discussion of other ways of discussing the 
quality of jobs). One can think of it as a ‘single-index’ model of skill – see Card and 
Lemieux [1996]. However, the next section takes a slightly different approach based 
on the analysis of Juhn, Murphy and Pierce [1993] with very similar results. 
First consider how the proportional change in employment from the mid-
1970s to the mid-1990s is related to the initial level of wages.  If the SBTC hypothesis 
is correct then one would expect to see a monotonic positive relationship between 
employment growth and initial wages.  Figure I groups occupations into the ‘lowest 
10%’, the ‘second-lowest 10%’, up to the ‘top 10%’ based on their median wage and 
cell size in 1979.  For example, the worst job quality decile captures 10% of all 
workers employed in the lowest paid occupations. Figure I shows large growth in the 
share of employment in the top two deciles, but also growth, albeit smaller, in the 
share of jobs in the bottom decile. Also, there has been a significant decline in 
middling jobs. Though the increase in the number of workers with bad jobs has been 
less relative to the increase in workers with good jobs, employment polarization into 
low paid and high paid work is clear from Figure I. It is this process of job 
polarization that is the central theme of this paper. 
Figure II presents the LFS data for the period 1979-99, where the size of the 
circles denotes the initial employment level in each occupation.  There is certainly no 
striking evidence of a positive monotonic relationship between employment growth 
and initial log median wages as the literature on SBTC might have led one to expect.  
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And, one can discern the J-shaped relationship that is going to appear in the 
regression results.  On Figure II, we also include a kernel regression estimate of the 
mean of employment growth conditional on job quality.3 
 Figure I and Figure II relate to one measure of employment, one definition of 
a job and to one survey (the LFS).  One would like to know whether the results are 
robust or not.  Because it is tedious to present graphs for every possible outcome, we 
turn to a regression way of presenting our results.   
 
Regression estimates 
The models we estimate are of the quadratic form: 
(1) 20 1 0 2 0j j jn w wβ β β∆ = + +  
where jn∆  is the change in log employment in job j and 0jw  is the initial log median 
wage in the job. 
 We experiment with a number of different measures of employment and jobs.  
Table IIa presents estimates combining employment for men and women.  The top 
half of Table IIa measures employment in terms of bodies using different definitions 
for a job and different surveys: we report results from the LFS and the NES using 
either 3-digit occupation codes only or the interaction of a 3-digit occupation code 
with a 1-digit industry code. But the results tell a similar story.  The linear term in (1) 
is negative and the quadratic term positive implying a U-shaped relationship between 
employment growth and the initial level of wages.  One might be concerned that the 
downward-sloping part of this relationship contains no data points but, as the final 
column in Table IIa makes clear, this is not the case: substantial numbers of workers 
                                                 
3
 These are Nadaraya-Watson estimates, using a bandwidth of 0.1 and an Epanechnikov kernel. 
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are in the downward-sloping part of the relationship4.  These regressions support the 
view that there has been polarization in the quality of jobs, with the employment 
growth being at the extreme ends of the distribution.  It should also be noted that the 
parameter estimates for the LFS and NES are very similar, which suggests that the 
non-random sampling in the NES is not too serious a problem.  We have also 
experimented with further aggregation or disaggregation in the jobs classification but 
this does not seem to make a great deal of difference to the qualitative results. 
 One might think that these results are misleading because much of the growth 
in employment has been in part-time jobs and these tend to be low-paid.  Hence, the 
estimates in the top half of Table IIa might be thought to over-state the employment 
growth in low-paid occupations. However, when we measure employment in terms of 
total hours, the results are very similar so this does not explain away the observed job 
polarization. 
 One might also think that the feminization of employment can explain this job 
polarization, with women accounting for the growth in relatively low-paid 
occupations.  But, as Table IIb and Table IIc show, one observes similar patterns for 
male and female employment considered separately although the trends are more 
marked for men.5 
One might also be concerned that the quality ranking of jobs changes a lot 
over time so that the patterns of employment growth are sensitive to the point in time 
at which job quality is measured.  Table III shows this is not the case: one gets similar 
results if one uses median wages at the end of the period to rank jobs.  This reflects 
the well-known fact that there is very considerable stability in the occupational wage 
structure.  
                                                 
4
 Inspection of the kernel regression line in Figure II should make it clear that this estimate of the 
proportion in the downward-sloping section is not an artifact of the quadratic specification adopted. 
5
 Note that the last column in Table IIc shows a missing if the U-shape is not significant. 
 12 
 
Employment Growth by Occupation 
What are the sorts of jobs that are growing and declining?  Table IV presents a 
‘top 10’ by job growth for occupations that have cells of a respectable size using the 
LFS data. The first column specifies the occupation. Since growth in the best jobs has 
been stronger than employment growth in the bad jobs, most of the jobs reported in 
Table IV pay above median hourly wages as can be seen from the second column in 
the table. Columns three and four report estimated employment levels by occupation 
whereas the final column calculates the percentage change in employment between 
1979 and 1999.   
 Rapidly growing lovely jobs are specialized occupations mainly in finance and 
business service industries located at the top end of the wage distribution. Positions 1, 
6 and 7 in the ‘Top 10’ however are taken by low paid jobs. Among these, the biggest 
growth in absolute numbers was in care assistants and attendants but there has also 
been a strong percentage increase in educational assistants and hospital ward 
assistants. Moreover, just outside the top-10 one finds large increases in the number 
of nursery nurses, hotel porters, merchandisers, window dressers and travel and flight 
attendants, among other low-paid service occupations. 
 Given the emphasis in the literature on SBTC the presence of the good jobs in 
Table IV is probably no surprise but the bad jobs might be more surprising.  However, 
this pattern is exactly what we would expect to see according to the ALM hypothesis 
as the rapidly-growing lousy jobs are all ones where it has proved difficult to 
substitute machines or computers for human labor.  To get a better idea of 
employment changes in the worst jobs, Table V lists the 10 lowest paying jobs given 
they are of considerable size, their median wage and employment in 1979 and 1999. 
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The biggest absolute increase in those jobs listed has been for sales assistant and 
checkout operators. 
 To see further evidence supportive of the ALM hypothesis Table VI lists the 
bottom 10 jobs by job growth. A comparison of the median job wages with the overall 
median suggests the decline in jobs has been largest for middling jobs in 
manufacturing occupations. 
 In sum, between the 1970s and late 1990s we have seen rapid employment 
growth in lovely jobs (mainly in professional and managerial occupations in finance 
and business services), some growth in lousy jobs (mainly in low-paying service 
occupations) and a decline in the numbers of middling jobs (mainly clerical jobs and 
skilled manual jobs in manufacturing). 
 
IV. An Alternative Approach 
 So far we have defined the quality of a job by the median wage in that job. 
Although this approach has the virtue of simplicity in that it enables us to label 
specific jobs as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ it does ignore the fact that there is substantial wage 
dispersion within jobs. One approach to dealing with this is taken by Juhn, Murphy 
and Pierce [1993] – although that paper is better known for other contributions – and 
Juhn [1999]. 
 They assume that each job (defined here as an occupation) potentially uses 
labor from each percentile of the wage distribution. They compute the share of labor 
from each percentile used in each job in a base year. Assuming that these ‘factor 
shares’ remain constant, one can then predict changes in employment for each 
percentile of the wage distribution by allowing changes in the total levels of 
employment in each occupation. Note that now the same job potentially contributes to 
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the predicted change in employment for each percentile rather than contributing only 
once as in the single-index approach taken in the previous section. 
Figure III plots these predicted employment changes between 1976 and 1995 
for different percentiles of the 1976 wage distribution. As Figure III shows, 
employment growth is positive for all workers earning less than the 11th percentile 
and more than the 86th percentile. Predicted growth at the top end is strongest, 
between 35% and 45%. Growth at the 5th percentile is between 8% and almost 20% 
percent whereas employment in the middling jobs is in decline. The conclusions 
derived are therefore the same as those derived from our more simplistic approach in 
the previous section that there has been increased polarization in the quality of jobs.  
It is noteworthy that only in the top 3 deciles does one see evidence of the positive 
relationship between skill and employment change as predicted by SBTC. 
The evidence of job polarization presented in this and the previous section are 
supportive of the ALM view of the impact of technology on the demand for labor as 
opposed to the SBTC hypothesis.  But, we need to understand the evidence that is 
often quoted in support of SBTC and the next two sections consider two of these – the 
growth in non-manual employment and the rise in the educational attainment of the 
workforce. 
 
V. Understanding the Growth in Non-Manual Employment 
A number of papers (e.g. Berman, Bound and Griliches [1994], Berman, 
Bound and Machin [1998], Machin and Van Reenen [1998]) have presented evidence 
that employment has shifted towards non-manual jobs and that this shift has been 
much more important within than between manufacturing industries.  As non-manual 
jobs tend to be better than manual jobs this is interpreted as evidence that technical 
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change is biased towards more skilled workers. And the fact that most of the shifts are 
within industries suggests that this trend is related to technical change that has very 
pervasive effects on all sectors of the economy.  As a statement about the average 
quality of jobs, this conclusion is undoubtedly right: our data also suggests that the 
‘average’ job quality is increasing.  But the simple binary distinction between manual 
and non-manual is simply not able to capture the increased polarization we have also 
argued is important6. 
 If the shift-share analysis is done for broader occupation groups and for the 
whole economy, not just manufacturing, we get the results presented in Table VII.  
For each occupation Table VII reports a manual/non-manual indicator taken from the 
LFS (M or NM respectively).  Occupations are ranked by their median wage. Then, 
for each of the two data sets, the first column reflects the total percentage point 
change in the share of each occupation group between 1979 and 1999. The second 
column measures the percentage point change due to changes within industries 
whereas the final column reports the change due to workers moving between 
industries. 
The results are rather more nuanced than earlier studies would suggest and in 
line with the ALM hypothesis. There is a large increase in the employment shares of 
managerial and professional workers, an increase in lovely jobs that is mostly ‘within’ 
industries. Both craft workers and machine operatives have large negative within and 
between components reflecting both the impact of technical change and the shift 
towards services. Routine clerical occupations have large negative employment effect 
within industries together with a sizeable positive ‘between’ component reflecting the 
shift to services. The increase in the employment share of low-paid personal and 
                                                 
6
  Indeed any binary distinction between low- and high-skill workers (whether in theoretical or 
empirical work) cannot have separate mean and variance effects. 
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protective services and sales occupations has a large within and between component 
reflecting the fact that technology has not managed to do these jobs and the shift 
toward services.   
 Therefore studies that use a simple manual/non-manual split (usually out of 
necessity rather than choice) and concentrate on manufacturing miss important 
features of the way the structure of employment is evolving.  If one broadens one’s 
view then one does see evidence for the ALM hypothesis.  
 
VI. Education and Occupation 
Another piece of widely cited evidence in favor of the SBTC hypothesis is that 
there has been a rapid increase in the level of educational attainment together with a 
rise in the returns to education. It is true that there is a lot of evidence that the average 
educational attainment of workers within jobs has changed.  One way of seeing this is 
Figure IV which uses the LFS to compute the fraction of workers that have education 
at ‘A’ level or above in the 1970s while re-weighting by the change in employment 
across occupations to predict the demand for educated workers if there had been no 
education up-grading within occupations.7 These predicted changes are much less 
than those actually observed suggesting an increase in educational attainment within 
jobs. 
The top panel of Figure V plots the fraction of workers with ‘A’ levels or a 
higher degree in each job in 1979. Clearly, the fraction increases when one moves to 
                                                 
7
 This re-weighting procedure gives the counterfactual mean in a familiar Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition of the probability of having ‘A’ levels (or above) explained by an exhaustive set of 
occupation dummies. Lemieux [2002] labels this procedure “a unifying approach”, combining elements 
from both Juhn, Murphy and Pierce [1993] (by constructing counterfactuals for the dependent variable 
at the individual level) and DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux [1996] (by re-weighting observations). 
According to Lemieux [2002], the advantage of re-weighting individual observations is that its use 
need not be limited to estimating counterfactual means but can be applied to estimating any moment of 
the counterfactual density of the dependent variable. Indeed, in Section VII we use a similar unifying 
approach to construct counterfactual percentiles of the wage distribution. 
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higher percentiles of the wage distribution. The bottom panel of Figure V looks at the 
percentage point change in the fraction of ‘A’ level (or above) workers in each job 
between 1979 and 1999.  It is noticeable that educational up-grading has occurred 
among all jobs.  
There are two interpretations of these findings.  First, that what we have 
defined as a ‘job’ is not constant over time and the educational and/or skill 
requirements within jobs has risen possibly because of SBTC within jobs.  Secondly, 
that as the educational attainment of the labor force has increased and middling jobs 
become relatively scarcer some educated workers have been forced to take lousier 
jobs than previously – this is the idea of the literature on over-qualification (see, for 
example, Sicherman [1991], Hartog [2000] and, for the UK, Green et al. [1999], 
Chevalier [2000] and Green and McIntosh [2002]) that typically finds that high 
proportions of people report that they are employed in jobs for which their 
educational qualifications are unnecessary.  Employers may also respond by raising 
the minimum educational standards to get certain jobs – what is known as 
credentialism.  To distinguish these two hypotheses requires some information on 
changes in skill use within occupations.  This is not so easy to find but we present two 
pieces of disparate information relevant to the question. 
First, consider the data on the use of the five DOT measures used by Autor, 
Levy and Murnane [2003].  Table VIII presents data on the average level of skill use 
in 1977, the change from 1977 to 1991 and the decomposition of this change into a 
within-occupation and a between-occupation component.  Panel A of Table VIII pools 
all occupations together and shows an overall increase in non-routine cognitive and 
interactive tasks together with a decrease in routine tasks (especially cognitive ones) 
and a smaller decrease in non-routine manual tasks.  But, the decomposition suggests 
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that, within occupations, there is only a rise in the non-routine interactive task and all 
other skills show declines, the decline being particularly large for the routine 
cognitive task. 
From the point of view of educational up-grading it is what is happening in the 
lousy jobs that is perhaps of more interest.  Panel B does the same exercise for jobs in 
the bottom half of the wage distribution.  Again one sees a big rise in the non-routine 
interactive task and large declines in routine tasks.  But, most of the increase in skill 
requirements is between-occupation: within-occupation task requirements are 
generally falling.  There is little evidence here that there is substantial SBTC within 
occupations (Spenner [1983] reaches similar conclusions). 
Our second piece of evidence on changing skill requirements within 
occupations comes from the UK Social Change and Economic Life Initiative (SCELI) 
survey conducted in 1986 and the 2001 Skills Surveys8.  Both of these surveys asked 
workers about the educational qualifications necessary to get the job they do and were 
then also asked whether these qualifications were necessary to do the job.  Only data 
at 1-digit occupation level are comparable in the two datasets.  Table IX presents 
some relevant information.  The second column gives the change from 1986 to 2001 
in the educational qualifications needed to get a job where qualifications are measured 
on a 5-point scale with 1 representing no qualifications and 5 a college degree.  In all 
occupations there is a rise in the level of qualifications required, with a very large rise 
in sales occupations and elementary occupations.  This could reflect greater skill 
requirements within occupations or a greater use of credentialism.  There is evidence 
(shown in the third column) that more workers report in 2001 that the education 
required to get the job is not necessary to do the job but, in the absence of any 
                                                 
8
 We are grateful to Francis Green for doing these computations for us. 
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information on the extent to which education is under-utilized, one cannot know 
whether this effect is large enough to outweigh the positive effect on skill levels of an 
increase in the level of education required.  Felstead, Gallie and Green [2002] also 
report that learning times are increasing within jobs. 
These two pieces of disparate evidence are not entirely consistent.  The DOT 
data do not suggest any significant skill up-grading within occupations, while the 
SCELI/SS data suggest an increase in the level of education required by employers 
although also an increasing proportion of workers reporting that this education is 
unnecessary to do the job.  But, it does seem that the supply of skills may be 
increasing faster than the demand in the bottom half of the distribution because the 
extent of over-qualification does not seem to be falling over time and, according to 
some estimates (e.g. Felstead, Gallie and Green [2002]), is actually increasing.9  
Consistent with this, Felstead, Gallie and Green [2002] report that there is excess 
demand for workers with no qualifications, an excess supply of people with low-level 
qualifications and a rising use of credentialism among the lowest-level occupations. 
 
VII. How Much of the Rise in Wage Inequality Can be Explained by Job 
Polarization? 
 
Rising Wage Inequality and Employment Polarization 
All the analysis so far has been about the quantity side of the labor market – what 
is happening to the employment of different types of workers.  But, the polarization of 
                                                 
9
 It has always been something of a puzzle to reconcile these findings of widespread over-qualification 
with rising employment and relative wages of educated workers.  Our finding of increased job 
polarization can explain why both phenomena may co-exist.  The increased supply of skills that has 
been necessary to meet the increased number of lovely jobs poses a problem for the increased number 
of lousy jobs. Because there has been an increase in the mean but no increase in the variance of 
educational qualifications, those in lousy jobs are increasingly likely to have higher levels of education 
than necessary for doing the job.  
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employment could also be expected to have led to increased wage inequality.  Of 
some interest is what fraction of the rise in wage inequality can be explained by this 
polarization of employment.  This is the subject of this section. 
In Figure VI we present the evolution of two actual measures of wage 
inequality over the period 1976-1995, the log(90/50) and the log(50/10) differentials, 
as well as a prediction of what would have happened if the only change in the wage 
distribution taking place is the change in the distribution of jobs in the economy.  To 
this end we assign everyone in the base year (here, 1976) a weight that is equal to the 
total number of workers in a job in a given year divided by the job cell size in the 
initial period. We then compute counterfactual percentiles of the re-weighted wage 
distribution.  
 As is well-known actual wage inequality rose very strongly in this period 
following a fall in 1977 (the result of the ‘Social Contract’ incomes policy then in 
place).  The rise in inequality is somewhat larger at the top of the distribution than at 
the bottom. Since the counterfactual log median increases only very little, the rises in 
the counterfactual log(90/50) and log(50/10) reflect large polarization.  In comparison 
with the actual changes, increased job polarization can explain 33% of the increase in 
the log(50/10) differential between 1976 and 1995 and 54% of the increase in the 
log(90/50) wage differential. It should also be noted that this process of polarization 
seems relatively smooth throughout the period: one cannot readily identify sub-
periods in which all the change occurred. 
The remaining rise in wage inequality can be thought of as coming from one 
of two sources: differential changes in median wages across jobs and within-job wage 
inequality.  For example, wage inequality will rise if median wages have risen faster 
in good jobs than bad jobs. The other potential source of increased wage inequality is 
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an increase in within-job pay dispersion. To look for evidence of this Table X reports 
regression estimates of median wage growth onto the log of the initial median wage10.  
Since estimates will be biased downwards when using the initial wage on both sides 
of the regression equation, we use the NES and run regressions using wages in 1977 
(rather than 1976) as a covariate. All point estimates are positive and all are 
statistically significant. These results suggest allowing median wages to change over 
time while keeping the variance of pay within each job constant could close the 
actual-counterfactual gap further. 
The implications for wage inequality are presented in Figure VII.  Here, we do 
the re-weighting described earlier and also adjust wages in every job cell by the 
change in log median wage in that cell. Now 51% of the increase in the log(50/10) 
differential between 1976 and 1995 and 79% of the increase in the log(90/50) wage 
differential can be explained. 
 
Within and Between Group Wage Inequality 
One implication of this is that the rise in within-job wage inequality has a 
relatively minor part to play in explaining the overall rise in wage inequality. This is 
in contrast with some studies that try to explain wage inequality in terms of age and 
education that typically find that most of the rise in inequality is due to rising within-
group wage inequality (see Levy and Murnane [1992] and Katz and Autor [1999] for 
a survey of the US literature and Machin [2003] for the UK).  The studies are correct 
given the variables they use to try to explain the rise in wage inequality but the 
evidence here suggests that this conclusion is sensitive to how the groups are defined. 
Unfortunately, a small industry has been established based on the premise that wage 
                                                 
10
 We experimented with the inclusion of a quadratic term but this was never significant. 
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inequality has risen very markedly among ‘identical’ workers and has been building 
theoretical explanations of this ‘fact’.  
 One particularly simple way to understand this is to consider what is 
happening to the 2R  in earnings functions.  Figure VIII graphs the 2R  from an 
earnings function estimated for each year on the NES in which the dependent variable 
is log hourly earnings, and the covariates include a complete set of dummies for age, 
industry and occupation, all interacted with gender.  There are two things to note: first 
the 2R  is high – averaging almost two-thirds – compared to the one-third found in a 
standard specification using the US CPS.  Secondly, there is no marked trend in the 
2R  over time if one also includes the most recent years for which data are available 
(we believe this is also true for the US CPS, see for example Lemieux [2002]).  The 
consequence is that the rise in the residual variance can explain only 1/3 of the total 
rise of the variance in log wages.   
The conclusion that the importance of within-group wage inequality depends 
on the controls one includes in an earnings function seems also consistent with US 
studies that have more detailed controls than is usual in earnings functions.  For 
example, Dunne et al. [2000] have controls for establishment fixed effects (which are 
obviously better than industry) and find they can explain much of the rise in wage 
inequality by widening between-plant wage gaps.  It seems likely that much of these 
wage gaps between plants can be explained in terms of the characteristics (in gender, 
age, education and occupation) of the workers within them – for example Hellerstein 
at al. [1999] find that a fairly rudimentary set of controls (less than 30) can explain 
40% of the variation in average wages across establishments.  
 
Explaining Relative Wage Changes 
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It is relatively easy to explain why wages at the top of the distribution have 
been increasing relative to the median as an increase in the demand in good jobs that 
has not been matched by an increase in supply.  But, it is not clear why the increase in 
the demand for bad jobs has not resulted in a rise in wages at the bottom relative to 
the median.  The rise in the number of bad jobs has coincided with a decline in their 
pay not just relative to the good jobs that are increasing in number but also relative to 
the middling jobs that are decreasing in number.  If the labor market is competitive 
this does not seem consistent with a view in which technology causes a shift in the 
demand for different types of labor but the supply curve is stable and the observed 
changes in wages and employment are simply movements along this supply curve11. 
In a competitive labor market it is wages in different segments that determine 
the position on the supply curve, so to reconcile the observed increase in relative 
employment in the worst jobs together with a fall in their relative wages one would 
have to try to explain how a fall in wages at the bottom end of the labor market 
increases labor supply in that part of the labor market.  While this might not be 
impossible (the labor supply curve could conceivably be backward-bending) it does 
not seem especially plausible.  It is perhaps more plausible to think that the labor 
supply curve is not stable and the labor force has changed in a way that has increased 
the number of workers who typically do lousy jobs.  It should be fairly obvious that 
the shifts in the educational attainment of the workforce should be such as to decrease 
the supply of workers who typically do bad jobs.  But, perhaps the change in the 
                                                 
11
 The Appendix presents a simple three-skill competitive model of the labor market that can be used as 
a more formal justification for the discussion that follows.  Juhn [1994] presents a model in which she 
claims that a fall in the demand for ‘middling’ jobs reduces wages more at the bottom but hers is really 
only a model with 2 types of skill but ‘middling’ people with some combination of both skills.  In this 
example there is no well-defined sense of a fall in demand for middling jobs.  
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gender and age composition of the workforce has some explanatory power12.  The 
next section explores this possibility.  
 
VIII. Can Supply Changes explain Relative Wage Changes? 
The top panel of Figure IX shows that, as is well-known, women tend to be 
over-represented in bad jobs.  This raises the possibility that the increased labor force 
participation of women has depressed wages in those occupations.  
To formally assess the importance of increased female participation and the 
changing age composition of the labor force we construct a counterfactual allowing 
for changes in the number of men and women in the labor force and the age 
composition while keeping the occupational composition for a given age-gender 
combination constant over time. The estimates for the relationship between the actual 
employment change and the initial median wage reported in the first 2 columns of 
Table XI are the same as those reported in Table IIa.  The final 2 columns of Table XI 
report the point estimates of a regression of counterfactual employment growth onto 
job median wages and its square in 1979. Though the coefficients do have the 
appropriate signs to predict the J-shape and are mostly significant, a comparison 
shows that the supply changes can only explain a small part of the change in wage 
dispersion. This should come as no surprise given the fact we argued before that there 
has been an increase in the number of good and bad jobs for males as well as females. 
And these estimates almost certainly over-state the importance of supply shocks as 
women are entering different (and better) jobs than they used to as shown by the 
bottom panel of Figure IX.   
                                                 
12
  One might also think that immigration is another potentially important supply shock.  But the 
fraction foreign-born in the UK labor force only rose from 7.3% in 1979 to 8.9% in 1989 and this rise 
was concentrated in the later years.  These changes are too small to have a large impact.  
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This still leaves us with the puzzle as to why wages have been falling in lousy 
jobs relative to those in ‘middling’ jobs.  One possible way to do this is to think of the 
labor market as being non-competitive in some way.  There are a number of ways in 
which this could be done.   
For example, Acemoglu (2001) presents a model of a labor market with 
frictions in which an increase in the supply of skilled workers encourages employers 
to create more lovely and lousy jobs and fewer middling jobs.  In this type of model 
‘supply creates its own demand’ and there is no need to resort to demand shocks 
caused by technological change to explain job polarization.  But it is a little bit hard to 
see how supply shocks of this type can explain the pattern of changes in occupational 
employment seen in Tables IV-VI – technology seems much more plausible as an 
explanation for these changes.  But, the Acemoglu story may have some relevance for 
explaining what is happening within occupations when employers often have a 
decision about what level of skill to require of workers doing these jobs. 
Another ‘non-competitive’ explanation is that institutions have changed in 
such a way as to lead to a fall in wages at the bottom end of the wage distribution.  
There is now a small literature in the US (DiNardo at al. [1996], Lee [1999], Teulings 
[2000]) that suggests that the evolution of unionization and the minimum wage can do 
a very good job in explaining what is happening to the bottom half of the wage 
distribution.  The UK has also seen a marked decline in unionization, a decline in 
minimum wages (though they were never very strong) and the indexation of welfare 
benefits to prices not wages.  Perhaps these changes can account for the rise in wage 
inequality in the bottom half of the distribution in the 1980s.  We leave the further 
exploration of this to another paper.    
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IX. Conclusions 
There is little doubt that technology has a powerful impact on the labor market.  But, 
the dominant current view about the nature of its impact, the hypothesis of skill-
biased technical change is only a partial truth and cannot explain all of the important 
changes in the labor market (see Card and DiNardo [2002] for an additional list of 
puzzles and problems).  Crudely, the SBTC hypothesis seems best able to explain 
what is happening in the top half of the wage distribution but not its bottom half.  
There, the more nuanced view about the impact of technology proposed by Autor, 
Levy and Murnane [2003] seems appropriate and it seems plausible that demand for 
‘middling’ jobs has fallen.  This paper has provided UK evidence of increased job 
polarization that is consistent with the ALM hypothesis.  It would be interesting to 
know whether similar phenomena can be observed in the Continental European 
countries that have not had the rises in wage inequality seen in the UK and the US. 
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Table I 
DOT Task Density by Wage Percentiles 
 
Fraction of workers above mean DOT 
task measure by wage percentiles 
DOT  Task Measure 
 
 
Mean DOT Task 
Measure 
 
 
≤ 33 
 
 
33-66 
 
≥ 66 
Non-Routine Cognitive  
3.755 
 
0.17 
 
0.48 
 
 
0.88 
Non-Routine Interactive 
 
 
 
2.417 
 
0.03 
 
0.14 
 
0.59 
Routine Cognitive 
 
 
 
4.582 
 
0.37 
 
0.63 
 
0.43 
Routine Manual 
 
 
 
3.901 
 
0.28 
 
0.58 
 
0.35 
Non-Routine Manual 
 
 
 
1.198 
 
0.49 
 
0.33 
 
0.31 
 
Notes: Task inputs are measured as in ALM [2003] and are between 0 and 10. The 
mean DOT task measure is the 1977 mean across 3-digit occupations. Wage 
percentiles are taken from the CPS MORG 1983 file.  
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Table IIa 
The Relationship between Employment Growth and Initial Median Wage: 
Men and Women Together 
 
Sample Sample 
Period 
Data 
 
Employment 
Measure 
β1 β2 Fraction 
in 
Declining 
Section 
Men+Women 1979-99 LFS 
(occ) 
Employment 
 
 
-4.541 
(0.700) 
2.107 
(0.297) 
52.93 
Men+Women 1976-95 NES 
(occ) 
Employment 
 
 
-3.412 
(0.664) 
1.373 
(0.267) 
72.57 
Men+Women 1979-99 LFS 
(occXind) 
Employment 
 
 
-4.804 
(0.472) 
2.109 
(0.198) 
62.80 
Men+Women 1976-95 NES 
(occXind) 
Employment 
 
 
-3.957 
(0.378) 
1.581 
(0.151) 
74.69 
Men+Women 1979-99 LFS 
(occ) 
Hours 
 
 
-4.218 
(0.785) 
2.047 
(0.327) 
28.42 
Men+Women 1976-95 NES 
(occ) 
Hours  
 
 
-3.603 
(0.775) 
1.576 
(0.319) 
56.85 
Men+Women 1979-99 LFS 
(occXind) 
Hours 
 
 
-4.331 
(0.514) 
1.969 
(0.213) 
49.67 
Men+Women 1976-95 NES 
(occXind) 
Hours  
 
 
-4.145 
(0.435) 
1.748 
(0.178) 
62.22 
 
Notes: Regressions are weighted by job cell size in the initial period. Occupation 
uses 3-digit SOC90 codes. Industry uses 1-digit SIC80 codes.  
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Table IIb 
The Relationship Between Employment Growth and Initial Median Wage: 
Men 
 
Sample Sample 
Period 
Data 
 
Employment 
Measure 
β1 β2 Fraction 
in 
Declining 
Section 
Men 1979-99 LFS 
(occ) 
Employment 
 
 
-5.807 
(1.317) 
2.447 
(0.482) 
39.66 
Men 1976-95 NES 
(occ) 
Employment 
 
 
-3.080 
(1.097) 
1.267 
(0.389) 
43.33 
Men 1979-99 LFS 
(occXind) 
Employment 
 
 
-6.039 
(0.719) 
2.413 
(0.265) 
55.84 
Men 1976-95 NES 
(occXind) 
Employment 
 
 
-4.697 
(0.535) 
1.783 
(0.191) 
68.91 
Men 1979-99 LFS 
(occ) 
Hours 
 
 
-5.022 
(1.361) 
2.246 
(0.502) 
27.98 
Men 1976-95 NES 
(occ) 
Hours  
 
 
-4.732 
(1.266) 
1.981 
(0.463) 
39.10 
Men 1979-99 LFS 
(occXind) 
Hours 
 
 
-5.622 
(0.755) 
2.337 
(0.281) 
45.48 
Men 1976-95 NES 
(occXind) 
Hours  
 
 
-5.906 
(0.618) 
2.309 
(0.226) 
64.32 
 
Notes: Regressions are weighted by job cell size in the initial period. Occupation 
uses 3-digit SOC90 codes. Industry uses 1-digit SIC80 codes.  
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Table IIc 
The Relationship between Employment Growth and Initial Median Wage: 
Women 
 
Sample Sample 
Period 
Data 
 
Employment 
Measure 
β1 β2 Fraction 
in 
Declining 
Section 
Women 1979-99 LFS 
(occ) 
Employment 
 
 
-1.580 
(1.025) 
1.222 
(0.505) 
- 
Women 1976-95 NES 
(occ) 
Employment 
 
 
-0.657 
(0.686) 
0.584 
(0.310) 
- 
Women 1979-99 LFS 
(occXind) 
Employment 
 
 
-3.363 
(0.840) 
1.942 
(0.411) 
54.69 
Women 1976-95 NES 
(occXind) 
Employment 
 
 
-2.227 
(0.517) 
1.256 
(0.239) 
50.95 
Women 1979-99 LFS 
(occ) 
Hours 
 
 
-1.441 
(1.177) 
1.415 
(0.597) 
- 
Women 1976-95 NES 
(occ) 
Hours  
 
 
-0.776 
(0.815) 
0.887 
(0.401) 
- 
Women 1979-99 LFS 
(occXind) 
Hours 
 
 
-3.199 
(0.934) 
2.034 
(0.466) 
34.17 
Women 1976-95 NES 
(occXind) 
Hours  
 
 
-2.650 
(0.618) 
1.659 
(0.306) 
29.58 
 
Notes: Regressions are weighted by job cell size in the initial period. Occupation 
uses 3-digit SOC90 codes. Industry uses 1-digit SIC80 codes.  
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 Table III 
The Relationship between Employment Growth and Terminal Median Wage 
 
Sample Sample 
Period 
Data 
 
Employment 
Measure 
β1 β2 Fraction 
in 
Declining 
Section 
Men+Women 1979-99 LFS 
(occ) 
Employment 
 
 
-1.915 
(0.491) 
0.839 
(0.166) 
29.59 
Men+Women 1976-95 NES 
(occ) 
Employment 
 
 
-2.920 
(0.387) 
1.090 
(0.127) 
54.96 
Men+Women 1979-99 LFS 
(occXind) 
Employment 
 
 
-0.581 
(0.289) 
0.403 
(0.097) 
- 
Men+Women 1976-95 NES 
(occXind) 
Employment 
 
 
-2.416 
(0.231) 
0.915 
(0.076) 
50.36 
Men+Women 1979-99 LFS 
(occ) 
Hours 
 
 
-1.651 
(0.519) 
0.806 
(0.171) 
17.22 
Men+Women 1976-95 NES 
(occ) 
Hours  
 
 
-2.770 
(0.433) 
1.101 
(0.140) 
38.97 
Men+Women 1979-99 LFS 
(occXind) 
Hours 
 
 
-0.271 
(0.286) 
0.356 
(0.094) 
- 
Men+Women 1976-95 NES 
(occXind) 
Hours  
 
 
-2.506 
(0.264) 
1.003 
(0.085) 
37.21 
 
Notes: Regressions are weighted by job cell size in the terminal period. 
Occupation uses 3-digit SOC90 codes. Industry uses 1-digit SIC80 codes.  
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Table IV 
Top 10 Occupations by Job Growth  
 
Occupation Median 
wage in 
1979 
 
Employment 
in 1979 
Employment 
in 1999 
% change 
in 
employment 
All 
 
3.052 24  332 613 27 343 467 12.373 
 
Care assistants & attendants 
 
 
2.345 103 837 539 407 419.474 
 
Software engineers 
 
 
5.008 34 009 171 769 405.065 
Management consultants & 
business analysts 
 
4.745 18 811 81 803 334.868 
Computer systems & data 
processing managers 
 
5.065 43 239 178 701 313.286 
Computer analysts & 
programmers 
 
4.842 76 083 302 617 297.745 
Educational assistants 
 
 
2.272 45 040 173 763 285.793 
Hospital ward assistants 
 
 
2.572 7 460 26 986 261.705 
Actors, entertainers, stage 
managers & producers 
 
4.719 22 549 73 030 223.870 
Treasurers & company 
financial managers 
 
5.105 37 794 119 812 217.015 
Financial institution and 
office managers 
 
4.511 107 138 322 608 201.114 
 
Notes: Employment data are taken from the LFS using 3-digit SOC90 codes. Wages 
are 1979 median hourly wages taken from the NES using 3-digit SOC90 codes.
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Table V 
Bottom 10 Occupations by Median Wage  
 
Occupation Median 
wage in 
1979 
 
Employment 
in 1979 
Employment 
in 1999 
% change 
in 
employment 
All 
 
3.052 24  332 613 27 343 467 12.373 
 
Hairdresser & barbers 
 
 
1.745 123 986 96 073 -22.513 
Bar staff 
 
 
1.832 119 455 188 319 57.647 
Shelf fillers 
 
 
1.938 49 699 97 144 95.462 
Sales assistants 
 
 
1.939 954 200 1 321 251 38.466 
Retail cash desk & check-out 
operators 
 
1.969 112 816 218 581 93.749 
Petrol pump forecourt 
attendants 
 
1.979 13 304 9 935 -25.321 
Kitchen porters 
 
 
2.003 178 758 143 092 -19.952 
Waiters & waitresses 
 
 
2.020 124 780 187 391 50.177 
Cleaners 2.132 
 
 
854 535 649 362 -24.009 
Beauticians 2.145 
 
 
24 536 28 946 17.972 
 
Notes: Employment data are taken from the LFS using 3-digit SOC90 codes. Wages 
are 1979 median hourly wages taken from the NES using 3-digit SOC90 codes.
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Table VI 
Bottom 10 Occupations by Job Growth 
 
Occupation Median 
wage in 
1979 
 
Employment 
in 1979 
Employment 
in 1999 
% change 
in 
employment 
All 
 
3.052 24  332 613 27 343 467 12.373 
 
Boring & drilling machine 
setters & setter-operators 
 
3.584 29 276 1 731 -94.086 
Coal mine laborers 
 
 
3.696 29 782 1 818 -93.892 
Face trained coalmining 
workers, shotfirers & deputies 
 
5.237 76 301 5 095 -93.322 
Ginding machine setters & 
operators 
 
3.557 56 426 8 164 -85.531 
Laborers in foundries 
 
 
3.219 14 801 2 505 -83.070 
Laborers in engineering & 
allied trades 
 
3.025 58 243 12 758 -78.095 
Electrical, energy, boiler & 
related plant operatives & 
attendants 
3.684 36 352 8 009 -77.968 
Spinners, doublers & twisters 
(in textiles and tannery 
process operatives) 
2.802 16 941 4 173 -75.363 
Originators, compositors & 
print preparers (in printing 
and related trades) 
3.404 48 878 12 162 -75.116 
Rail signal operatives & 
crossing keepers 
3.010 
 
 
13 761 3 571 -74.045 
 
Notes: Employment data are taken from the LFS using 3-digit SOC90 codes. Wages 
are 1979 median hourly wages taken from the NES using 3-digit SOC90 codes. 
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Table VII 
Shift-share Analysis of Employment Shares by Occupation 
 
 Occupation Wage 
 
NES 
 
LFS 
 total within between total within between 
Professional occupations  
                                    (NM) 
5.914 1.709 1.127 0.582 3.733 2.838 0.895 
Managers and 
administrators             (NM) 
4.117 5.204 4.588 0.616 5.606 5.271 0.335 
Associate professional and 
technical occupations  (NM) 
3.823 2.579 1.700 0.879 4.466 3.446 1.020 
Craft and related 
occupations                    (M) 
3.277 -8.158 -3.738 -4.420 -7.883 -3.461 -4.422 
Plant and machine 
operatives                       (M) 
3.055 -5.579 -1.809 -3.770 -5.195 -1.362 -3.833 
Clerical and secretarial 
occupations                 (NM) 
2.841 1.291 -1.879 3.171 -2.105 -5.388 3.283 
Personal and protective 
service occupation (NM/M) 
2.668 3.516 1.969 1.547 3.502 1.732 1.770 
Other occupations   
                                       (M) 
2.558 -2.527 -2.775 0.248 -3.398 -3.564 0.166 
Sales occupations 
                                    (NM) 
2.132 1.964 0.817 1.147 1.272 0.487 0.785 
 
Notes: Employment changes are taken between 1979 and 1999 for the LFS and 1976-1995 for the NES. Reported wages are 1979 median hourly 
wages taken from the NES using 1-digit SOC90 occupations. The decomposition is done using 1-digit SIC80 industry codes.  
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Table VIII 
DOT Task Shifts Within and Between Occupations 
 
DOT  Task Measure Mean 1977 
 
Change 1977-1991 
 
Panel A: Good and Bad Occupations 
 
 
 total 
 
within between 
Non-Routine Cognitive 
 
 
3.755 0.084 -0.047 0.131 
Non-Routine Interactive 
 
 
2.417 0.504 0.137 0.367 
Routine Cognitive 
 
 
4.582 -0.854 -0.564 -0.290 
Routine Manual 
 
 
3.901 -0.146 -0.025 -0.121 
Non-Routine Manual 
 
 
1.198 -0.132 -0.094 -0.038 
Panel B: Bad Occupations 
Non-Routine Cognitive 
 
 
3.338 -0.027 -0.106 0.079 
Non-Routine Interactive 
 
 
2.169 0.367 0.019 0.348 
Routine Cognitive 
 
 
3.929 -1.116 -0.871 -0.245 
Routine Manual 
 
 
3.879 -0.224 -0.065 -0.159 
Non-Routine Manual 
 
 
0.847 -0.037 -0.032 -0.005 
 
Notes: Task inputs are measured as in ALM [2003] and are between 0 and 10. For 
Panel A, the reported means are weighted using 463 3-digit COC occupations. Panel 
B uses 208 occupations with hourly earnings below overall average wages using 1984 
CPS data. Changes between 1977 and 1991 are measured using 3-digit COC 
occupations and employment changes between 1984 and 1997.  
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Table IX 
Changes in Skill Requirements within Jobs, 1986-2001 
 
Occupation Change in education level 
required to get job,  
1986-2001 
Change in fraction 
reporting required 
education not necessary to 
do job, 1986-2001 
Managerial 
 
0.25 0.014 
Professional 
 
0.12 0.021 
Associate 
Professional 
0.31 0.072 
Clerical 
 
0.10 0.046 
Craft 
 
0.25 0.043 
Personal Services 
 
0.50 0.110 
Sales 
 
0.54 0.093 
Operatives 
 
0.08 0.063 
Elementary 
 
0.24 0.076 
 
Notes: Data come from 1986 SCELI data and 2001 Skills Survey.  Education required 
is measured on a 5-point scale with 1 being no qualifications and 5 a college degree.  
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Table X 
Relationship between Wage Growth and Initial Median Wage 
 
Sample Sample 
Period 
Data 
 
Relative to 
1976  
Relative to 
1977 
 
Men+Women 
 
 
1976-95 NES 
(occ) 
0.239 
(0.029) 
0.267 
(0.029) 
Men+Women 
 
 
1976-95 NES 
(occXind) 
0.109 
(0.013) 
0.156 
(0.014) 
Men 
 
 
1976-95 NES 
(occ) 
0.374 
(0.033) 
0.403 
(0.033) 
Men 
 
 
1976-95 NES 
(occXind) 
0.178 
(0.017) 
0.237 
(0.017) 
Women 
 
 
1976-95 NES 
(occ) 
0.284 
(0.052) 
0.371 
(0.052) 
Women 
 
 
1976-95 NES 
(occXind) 
0.086 
(0.027) 
0.188 
(0.029) 
 
Notes: Regressions are weighted by initial job cell size in terms of 
employment. The dependent variable is the change in log wages between 1976 
and 1995, the regressors the log wage in 1976 or 1977. 
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Table XI 
The Impact of Supply Changes 
 
Sample 
Period 
Data 
 
Employment 
Measure 
Actual 
 
Counterfactual 
 
   β1 β2 β1 β2 
1979-99 LFS 
(occ) 
Employment 
 
 
-4.541 
(0.700) 
2.107 
(0.297) 
-1.022 
(0.100) 
0.378 
(0.042) 
1976-95 NES 
(occ) 
Employment 
 
 
-3.412 
(0.664) 
1.373 
(0.267) 
-0.908 
(0.121) 
0.312 
(0.048) 
1979-99 LFS 
(occXind) 
Employment 
 
 
-4.804 
(0.472) 
2.109 
(0.198) 
-0.834 
(0.041) 
0.300 
(0.017) 
1976-95 NES 
(occXind) 
Employment 
 
 
-3.957 
(0.378) 
1.581 
(0.151) 
-0.717 
(0.041) 
0.241 
(0.016) 
1979-99 LFS 
(occ) 
Hours 
 
 
-4.218 
(0.785) 
2.047 
(0.327) 
-0.842 
(0.120) 
0.325 
(0.049) 
1976-95 NES 
(occ) 
Hours 
 
 
-3.603 
(0.775) 
1.576 
(0.319) 
-0.688 
(0.129) 
0.253 
(0.053) 
1979-99 LFS 
(occXind) 
Hours 
 
 
-4.331 
(0.514) 
1.969 
(0.213) 
-0.603 
(0.048) 
0.229 
(0.020) 
1976-95 NES 
(occXind) 
Hours 
 
 
-4.145 
(0.435) 
1.748 
(0.178) 
-0.506 
(0.044) 
0.186 
(0.018) 
 
Notes: Regressions are weighted by job cell size in the initial period. Occupation uses 
3 digit SOC90 codes. Industry uses 1 digit SIC80 codes. The counterfactual allows for 
changes in the number of men and women in the labor force and the age composition 
(using 5-year age brackets) while keeping constant the occupational composition for a 
given age-gender combination. 
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Figure I 
Percentage Change in Employment Share by Job Quality Decile 
 
 
 
Notes: Employment data are taken from the LFS using 3-digit SOC90 codes. 
Employment changes are taken between 1979 and 1999. Quality deciles are based on 
3-digit SOC90 median wages in 1979 taken from the NES. 
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Figure II 
Employment Growth by Job Median Wage 
 
 
 
Notes: Employment data are taken from the LFS using 3-digit SOC90 codes. 
Employment changes are taken between 1979 and 1999. Wages are 3-digit SOC90 
median wages in 1979 taken from the NES.  
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Figure III 
The Impact of Job Polarization on Employment Growth by Wage Percentile 
 
-
40
-
20
0
20
40
 
0 20 40 60 80 100
percentile (76)
3-digit occupation 3-digit occupation X 1-digit industry
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t (7
6-
95
)
 
 
Notes: Data are taken from the NES using 3-digit SOC90 codes. Employment 
changes are taken between 1976 and 1995. Percentiles are the 1976 wage density 
percentiles.  
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Figure IV 
How Much of Rising Educational Attainment can be explained by Job 
Polarization? 
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Notes: Data are taken from the LFS using 3-digit SOC90 occupation codes. 
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Figure V 
Fraction and Change in Fraction of Workers by Education and Job Median 
Wage 
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Notes: Employment data are taken from the LFS using 3-digit SOC90 codes.  
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Figure VI 
How Much of Actual Wage Dispersion Can Be Explained by Job Polarization? 
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Notes: Data are taken from the NES. The top panel uses 3-digit SOC90 codes. The 
bottom panel uses 3-digit SOC90 codes interacted with 1-digit SIC80 codes. The 
counterfactual keeps constant median wage and wage dispersion within occupations.  
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Figure VII 
The Impact of Job Polarization and Changing Relative Wages Across Jobs on 
Wage Inequality 
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Notes: Data are taken from the NES. The top panel uses 3-digit SOC90 codes. The 
bottom panel uses 3-digit SOC90 codes interacted with 1-digit SIC80 codes. The 
counterfactual keeps constant wage dispersion within occupations. 
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Figure VIII 
The Changing R2 in the UK Earnings Function 
 
R
2
year
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
.6
.65
.7
 
 
Notes: Data are taken from the NES. The dependent variable is log hourly earnings 
and the covariates included are age, industry and occupation dummies, all interacted 
with gender.  The dip in 1995 and 1996 is the result of considerably more workers 
reporting implausibly low wages of below £0.5 per hour.  If the data is trimmed the 
dip is much less pronounced. 
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Figure IX 
Fraction and Change in the Fraction of Female Workers by Job Median Wage 
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Notes: Employment data are taken from the LFS using 3-digit SOC90 codes.  
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Appendix 
The Response of Relative Wages and Employment to a Demand Shock 
 
Let us assume there are three different kinds of labor that we shall call low, medium 
and high-skill.  Denote the share in employment of the three types by , ,L M HN N N  
and their wages by , ,L M HW W W .  We are going to be interested in how relative wages 
and employment change with particular types of technical progress.  As a ‘numeraire’ 
let us choose the middle skill level and define:  
 / , , , ,i i Mx X X i L H X N W= = =  (1) 
and similar notation will be used later for other variables that are introduced. 
 
We are interested in whether a simple supply and demand model with a labour 
demand shock (caused by changes in technology) can explain the stylised facts of 
rising job polarization with faster employment growth at the top and rising wage 
inequality.  In terms of the model what has happened in the data is 
ln( ) ln( ) 0H Ld N d N> > ,  (the job polarization) and ln( ) 0 ln( )L Hd w d w< <  (rising 
wage inequality) and the question is whether we can find a plausible technology 
shock and parameter values to make this the outcome of a simple supply and demand 
model.  We start with the problematic part which is the supply curve and then turn to 
the unproblematic part, the demand curve.  
 
The Labour Supply Curve 
We will take a simple model in which aggregate labor supply is fixed and individuals 
need to decide whether to work in low-skill, middling or high-skill jobs.  In this case 
the supply of labour to a particular skill level will potentially depend on the wages of 
all three skill groups but will be homogeneous of degree zero in these wages.  The 
most natural assumption is that the supply of labour to a particular segment is 
increasing in its own wage and decreasing in the wage of the other segments.  But, if 
this is the case we cannot interpret the observed job polarization and rising wage 
inequality as a move along a stable supply curve caused by a technology-induced shift 
in the demand for labour as the fall in the wage of low-skill workers relative to both 
high-skill and middling workers should induce a fall in the supply of labour to the 
low-skill segment. 
   
To see this more formally consider a simple model. Assume that the utility of 
individual i from working in a job of skill s is given by: 
 
i
is
is
WU
C
=
 (2) 
where the ‘C’ represents a difficulty for individual i of working in a particular job: we 
will assume there is heterogeneity in these parameters across individuals.    
Individuals choose to supply labor to the segment that offers the highest utility.  It is 
more common to assume that skill levels for individuals are immutable but this set-up 
allows relative wages to affect supplies of labor to different segments.  One can 
always model the fact that certain workers cannot work in high-skill jobs by assuming 
that HC  is very high for them.  
 
The decision for individual i will be the following:  work in the low-skill segment if:  
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 ,
iL L L L
iL L iL iH iH
iM M H H
C W W w
c w c c c
C W W w
= < = < =  (3) 
work in the middle segment if:  
 ,
H
iL L iH H
M
W
c w c w
W
> > =  (4) 
and work in the high-skill segment if:  
 ,
L
iH H iL iH
H
w
c w c c
w
< >    (5) 
Note that the decision of each individual only depends on relative wages so aggregate 
labor supplies only depend on relative wages.  One can represent the decision of each 
individual for given relative wages on a simple diagram – Figure A1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The overall labor supplies will be determined by the distribution of individuals’ 
relative skill costs.  We know from the technology that we need to have both more 
skilled and unskilled workers relative to middling ones associated with rising wage 
inequality.  The rise in wage inequality will alter the picture in the following way: 
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Where we have marked the initial skill decision and the final one associated with each 
region.  One can see that there is an unambiguous increase in the supply of labor to 
the high-skill segment and a fall in supply to the low-skill segment.  The important 
point is that this type of model cannot explain the simultaneous of observation of 
falling relative wages in low-skill jobs together with a rise in the share of 
employment13. 
 
So, if a simple demand-supply framework is to explain what is going on, we need to 
have a supply curve in which falling wages at the bottom lead to an increase in labor 
supply there i.e. the labor supply curve has a ‘backward-bending’ aspect, the 
plausibility of which is open to question. 
 
The Labour Demand Curve    
It is not difficult to present a production function in which technological change 
induces, for fixed relative wages, job polarization.  For example, suppose that the 
production function has the following Leontief form:  
 ( )min , ,L L M M H HY A N A N A N=  (6) 
Then, using the fact that 1L M HN N N+ + =  employment will be determined by 
technology alone and given by: 
 
H
L
L H L H
aN
a a a a
=
+ +
 (7) 
 
L
H
L H L H
aN
a a a a
=
+ +
 (8) 
so that there will be job polarization with more rapid employment growth at the top if 
0H La a> >  which might be the case if technical change radically increases the 
productivity of middling labor and slightly increases that of low-skill labor. 
 
Now consider a more general model.  Assume there is a constant returns to scale 
production function in the 3 types of labor (think of other inputs such as capital as 
being concentrated out of this) that we denote by: 
 ( ), ,L L M M H HY F A N A N A N=  (9) 
where the iA  represents labor-augmenting technical progress for labor of type i.  Let 
us define the employment of skill i in efficiency units as: 
 i i iN A N=%  (10) 
and the cost per efficiency unit of labor of skill i as:   
 /i i iW W A=%  (11) 
where iW  is the wage of labor of skill i. 
 Associated with the production function in (9) will be a cost function that, 
given the assumption of constant returns to scale can be written as:  
 ( ), ,L M HC C W W W Y= % % %  (12) 
                                                 
13
 Matters would be easier if we only had to explain the rise in employment of low-skill relative to 
middling employment as part of the increase in the high-skill workers comes from those who were 
initially middling workers and it is possible that the net result is a fall in middling workers that is larger 
than the fall in low-skill workers resulting in a rise in the supply of low-skill relative to middling 
workers. 
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and, given that the cost function must be homogeneous of degree 1 in its arguments, 
we can write this as:  
 ( ) ( ),1, ,M L H M L HC W C w w Y W c w w Y= =% %% % % %  (13) 
Now, by Shephard’s Lemma we will have that the output-constant demands for 
efficiency units of labor of different skills will be given by:  
 ( ),L L L HN c w w Y=% % %  (14) 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,M L H L L L H H H L HN c w w w c w w w c w w Y= − −  % % % % % % % % %  (15) 
 
 ( ),H H L HN c w w Y=% % %  (16) 
 
from which one can derive the following expressions for the demand for low and high 
skill labor relative to middle skill labor (in efficiency units):  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ln ln , ln , , ,L L L H L H L L L H H H L Hn c w w c w w w c w w w c w w= − − −      % % % % % % % % % % %  (17) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ln ln , ln , , ,H H L H L H L L L H H H L Hn c w w c w w w c w w w c w w= − − −      % % % % % % % % % % %  (18) 
Now let us totally differentiate these two equations.  First, equation (17): 
 ( ) [ ] [ ]( ) ( ) ( )ln , , ,
L LL L LH H H LH L HH HLL L LH H
L
L L H L L L H H H L H
w c dw c dw w c dw c dwc dw c dwd n
c c w w w c w w w c w w
+ + ++
= +
− −
% % % % % %% %% % % % % % % % %  (19) 
To simplify this expression let us define the share of labor of skill i as: 
 
i i
i
w c
s
c
=
%
 (20) 
and the elasticity of substitution between labor of skill i and skill j as:  
 
ij
ij
i j
cc
c c
σ =  (21) 
Then, after some re-arrangement one can write (19) as:  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
ln ln ln
ln ln ln ln
1
L L LL L H LH H
L L LL L H LH H H L LH L H HH H
L H
d n s d w s d w
s s d w s d w s s d w s d w
s s
σ σ
σ σ σ σ
= +
+ + +
+
− −
% % %
% % % %
 (22) 
which can be written as:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ln lnln
1
L LL H LH LL L H HH H LH HH H
L
L H
s s d w s s d w
d n
s s
σ σ σ σ σ σ+ − + + −      
=
− −
% %%
 (23) 
Manipulation of the equation for the relative employment of high-skill labor, (18), 
leads to an expression analogous to (23): 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ln lnln
1
L LL L LH LL L H HH L LH HH H
H
L H
s s d w s s d w
d n
s s
σ σ σ σ σ σ+ − + + −      
=
− −
% %%
 (24) 
We can represent this is matrix form as: 
 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )d n d w d w d a= −Σ = −Σ +Σ% %  (25) 
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where ln( )n  is a column vector of ln( )Ln  and ln( )Hn  etc.  Using (10) and (11) and 
using the fact that 1L M HN N N+ + =  this can be converted to a relationship between 
change in the employment shares of low- and high-skill labor and actual relative 
wages of the form:  
 ( )1ln( ) ln( ) ln( )d N B d w I d a−= −Σ + Σ −    (26) 
where 
1
1
L H
L H
n n
B
n n
+ 
=  + 
.  As in the simple Leontief example, it is not hard to find 
technology shocks that, for fixed relative wages, lead to job polarization.  But, to 
analyse what is happening in the labor market as a whole we also need to model the 
supply of labor.   
 
The Response to Changes in Technology 
Assuming that the supply of labor different skill levels simply depends on relative 
(and not absolute) wages we can derive:  
 ln( ) ln( )d N Ed w=  (27) 
where E  is the matrix of own-wage and cross-wage labor supply elasticities.  We 
allow all relative wages to potentially affect the relative supply of a particular skill 
level.  Combining (26) and (27) we have the following reduced-form expressions for 
the changes in relative wages and employment wages in response to technology 
shocks:  
 ( ) ( )11 1ln( ) 1 ln( )d w E B B d A−− −= + Σ Σ −  (28) 
and:  
 ( ) ( )11 1ln( ) 1 ln( )d N E E B B d A−− −= + Σ Σ −  (29) 
We know what has happened in the data, namely ln( ) 0Ld N > , ln( ) 0Hd N >  (the job 
polarization) and ln( ) 0Ld w < , ln( ) 0Hd w >  (rising wage inequality) and the question 
is whether we can find a plausible technology shock and parameter values to make 
this the outcome of a simple supply and demand model.  
 As discussed above the problem comes from thinking about the first line of the 
supply equation (27):  
 ln( ) ln( ) ln( )L LL L LH Hd N e d w e d w= +  (30) 
We would expect that 0LLe >  and 0LHe <  so that an increase in the wage of the low 
skill relative to the middling skill results in an increase in the supply of low relative to 
middling skill workers.  But a stable labor supply curve cannot then explain what is 
happening – one needs some ‘backward-bending’ element to the supply curve or that 
an increase in the high-skill wage raises the supply of low-skill workers.  Neither of 
these seems particularly attractive. 
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